Emotional Intelligence
Meets Virtue Ethics:
Implications for Educators

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Preamble

The notion that there is more than one kind of intelligence for human beings, and that social and emotional intelligence (EI) is just as critical as cognitive intelligence for success in the world is by now fairly well-received and well-established in North American educational contexts. The main proponents of social and EI are Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee (2002) who are noted for advancing the notion that social and emotional intelligence is important for effective leadership in any organizations, including teacher education and teaching in schools. Convinced that this notion is applicable to all educational contexts, Goleman with others founded the Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional Learning (CASEL) in 1994 with the mission “to establish social and emotional learning as an essential part of education” (CASEL, 2009). His work has been enormously influential in various education and leadership contexts, ranging from business leadership education to classroom management. But the more we—the authors of this article—are impressed by the magnitude of salutary influence that the Goleman et al. (2002) EI work spreads in diverse educational domains, the more we see its limitations as an educational project that can actually and practically augment people’s EI and ethics.

We have chosen to consider EI in this article not only because of its far-reaching influence in the field of education as abovementioned but also because of the claim that it was inspired by Aristotle’s virtue ethics.
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(Goleman, 1995) and its association with ethical development. Our own research and practice interest has been fostering ethical development in people via virtue ethics, and if EI is, as Goleman et al. (2002) claimed, such a singularly important ingredient, we would like to investigate their conceptualization of EI and consider the possibility of further developing and fortifying it. Given the acceptance of EI, its claimed value and roots in virtue ethics has prompted us to research the limitations of the EI work by Goleman et al. (2002), and to search for works that would address these limitations. The Goleman et al. (2002) EI project has attracted a healthy debate regarding its philosophic and practical foundations. This discussion suggests that there is empirical evidence that EI has a positive impact on student’s behaviour; however, we believe instructive philosophic concerns remain. We are particularly concerned about the educator’s EI impacting students’ learning and emotional intelligence, a concern also identified by others (Jennings & Greenberg, 2009). Our paper advances the thesis that the cultivation of educators’ EI requires the practice of virtue ethics. We establish this thesis by first examining the limitations of the Golemanian EI, and then by showing how these limitations can be addressed by MacIntyre’s (1984, 1988) virtue ethics, which is a contemporary version of Aristotelian ethics. In the process, we also address what we see as MacIntyre’s (1984, 1988) theoretical limitations that are in the way of extending virtue ethics to become the cornerstone of school teaching and learning. We also bring in Vokey’s (2001) work to support our thesis. We present our work on the marriage of EI and virtue ethics as a challenge to the conventional and hegemonic conception and practice of education that marginalizes the education of the heart.

Educators’ Emotions Are No Private Matter

Goleman et al. (2002) held that the leader acts as the group’s emotional guide and “has maximal power to sway everyone’s emotions” (Goleman, et al., 2002, p. 5). The emotions of the leader are important because, for example, if people’s emotions are pushed toward enthusiasm, performance can soar. He refers to this effect as resonance. That is, those under the influence and guidance of the leader/educator come into emotional resonance with her or him: “Whether an organization fails or flourishes depends to a remarkable extent on the leaders’ effectiveness in this primal emotional dimension” (Goleman et al., 2002, p. 5). To elaborate, a learning organization’s performance depends on whether the emotional mood is positive or negative, and this is established by the leader whose emotions are contagious. As this is a crucial point
in the Golemanian thinking, we wish to elaborate on it and draw out implications for the cultivation of EI. Goleman et al. (2002) hold that emotions spread whenever people are near one another, even when the contact is nonverbal. There have been a number of empirical researches that support this thesis. For example, Friedman states: “[W]hen three strangers sit facing each other in silence for a minute or two, the one who is most emotionally expressive transmits his or her mood to the other two—without speaking a single word” (as cited in Goleman et al., 2002, p. 7). To elaborate, the following has been observed:

People seem to be capable of mimicking other people’s facial, vocal, and postural expressions with stunning rapidity. As a consequence, they are able to feel themselves into other emotional lives to a surprising extent . . . Awareness of the existence of emotional contagion may prove useful in understanding and perhaps advancing various areas of interpersonal communication between . . . teachers and students. (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993, p. 99)

There is substantial evidence that people mimic speech, facial expressions, mannerisms, moods and emotions of others (Chartrand, Maddux, & Lakin, 2005). As well, recent studies of the brain show that the limbic system, which determines our emotional response, is an open system that relies on external sources to regulate itself. That would explain why people rely on emotional connections to other people for their emotional stability (Goleman et al., 2002). According to Rosengren et al. (as cited in Goleman et al., 2002), “three or more incidents of intense stress within a year triple the death rate in socially isolated middle aged men, whereas this experience has no impact on the death rate of men who cultivate many close relationships” (p. 7). Lewis et al. (as cited in Goleman et al., 2002) suggest that the limbic system is open to signals transmitted by others in a way that can alter hormone levels, cardiovascular function, sleep rhythms, and immune functions of others (p. 7). Friedman and Riggio (as cited in Goleman et al., 2002) observed that heart rates and other physiological responses of two people synchronize after a 15-minute conversation. This synchronization of moods can occur even when there is no conversation. Goleman et al. stated: “[P]eople in groups inevitably catch feelings from one another, sharing everything from jealousy to envy to angst or euphoria” (2002, p. 7). According to Kelly and Barsade (as cited in Goleman et al., 2002), “the more cohesive the group, the stronger the sharing of mood” (p.7). Furthermore, research has demonstrated that the leader’s moods are contagious: that is, they are transferred to subordinates in self-managing groups, and influence group processes that are critical to group effectiveness (Cote & Sy, 2005). These findings have a major implication for the education
of leaders in any arena of educational leadership capacities—including schoolteachers.

Given that the leader’s personal and private emotions are contagious, Goleman et al. (2002) draw a profound conclusion. He holds that how a leader feels is not a private matter: It has public consequences. Therefore, “the most meaningful act of responsibility that leaders can do is to regulate their own state of mind” (Goleman et al., 2002, p. 47) and “effective leadership demands the capacity for managing one’s own turbulent feelings while allowing the full expression of positive emotions” (Goleman et al., 2002, pp. 48). For many students, negative emotions impede learning while positive emotions support learning (Schutz & Perkrun, 2007). The terms negative and positive refer to individual experiences. Goleman et al. suggested that the leader’s (in our context, educator’s) private emotions have a significant impact on the emotional experience of those who work with her or him, and hence on learning outcomes. This suggests that leaders have the responsibility for developing their own EI, given that their emotional well-being and competency affect people’s learning and growth. Now we come back to the crucial question: how do we increase emotional intelligence? What is the process of education for this? As we shall show, Golemanian understanding of how to educate people for EI has some fundamental limitations. Unless we address this, we cannot move forward in any serious way with our goal of educating individuals for emotional intelligence.

**Limitations of Goleman et al. EI as an Educational Project**

In the Goleman et al. (2002) conception, EI is fundamentally an individualistic trait. It is not predicated on principles espoused in MacIntyre’s (1984) virtue ethics which holds that the emotions of individuals must be cultivated in the context of a communal or institutional practice that values internal goods, such as justice, courage, and honesty. While Goleman et al. (2002) saw the communal implication of the individual leaders’ emotional states, this did not affect his conceptualization of the cultivation of EI as an individual rather than a relational and communal matter.

Let us further explicate and elaborate what we are saying here. When a human quality is taken as an individual trait, we tend to see it as something that the individual possesses, like intelligence or beauty. Having reified such quality as an individual attribute, we proceed to increase it by targeting it with enhancing techniques and resources such as how-to instructions, supplements, tools, exercises, and enrichments. The same seems to be happening with increasing EI.

Our point is that it is a mistake to reify human qualities, including
EI, and treat them as individual traits. Human qualities in individuals are invariably and inextricably involved in and constructed out of long-term socialization and acculturation contexts and processes that individuals participate (Holland, Skinner, Lachicotte, & Cain, 1998). What this means in terms of education of these qualities is that we need to talk about communal and institutional practices that guide and shape the individuals who participate in them. This understanding is missing in the work of Goleman et al. (2002), and therein lie the limitations and weaknesses of their work on EI. We are interested in exploring the communal and institutional practices that foster and cultivate EI. To us, what such cultivation amounts to is essentially none other than what has been traditionally known as virtue ethics. Our next step, then, is to investigate virtue ethics to see how it will help with the cultivation of EI.

**MacIntyre’s Virtue Ethics**

We will now sketch out MacIntyre’s (1984) virtue ethics and how it may apply to our society, and compare this virtue ethics to Golemanian proposals for the development of social and emotional intelligence. First a little background discussion of MacIntyre’s (1984) ethics: This will help us see the matter of EI as an ethical task. MacIntyre (1984) argued that ethics is a science that rests on a threefold scheme that assumes a contrast between (a) human nature as it is, and (b) human nature as it could be if it realized its purpose or telos. The third element is (c) the human effort to move from the former to the latter, which constitutes ethics. To be an ethical being is to make this effort in the face of continual human failure to fulfill telos. What helps and furthers this effort is virtue: the human agency to regulate and discipline passions, and organize and direct will towards one’s telos.

A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods. (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 191)

It is through the exercise of virtues that “our desires and emotions are to be put into order,” which enables one to move from the former state to the latter, and realize “our true nature and to reach our true end” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 52). To acquire the virtues requires one to cultivate a certain asceticism wherein one is aware of one’s initial appetites, passions, and emotions, and yet is able to hold them in abeyance for the purpose of fulfilling one’s telos (MacIntyre, 1999).

So far we have articulated MacIntyre’s (1984) three-fold schema regarding the individual’s development of virtue ethics. That is, the in-
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query concerning: (1) who I am now; (2) what I could be; (3) and what is the practice of ethics that will move me from where I am today towards my ideal? MacIntyre (1984) held that this process occurs within the context of practices and within a tradition. For example, a woman who is a Buddhist, a doctor, and a mother is involved in the tradition of Buddhism and two practices: medicine and motherhood. Tradition provides a context for her ethics across those practices, and provides her with an overarching sense of the good that helps her make decisions about the priority of practices. For example, ideally, her tradition will inform her which practice should take priority with respect to the amount of time she should dedicate to motherhood versus medicine. Each of the practices also provides a context, history, and standards of excellence within which she will operate. Her values and ethic are expressed in her daily work with people. Does she have compassion? Is she trustworthy? Does she have courage? Does she follow the codified ethics of her practice? And finally does she earn an income, and contributes to supporting her family to be happy and healthy? In this brief description, which will be elaborated later, it can be seen that context, community, and tradition are critical elements providing a framework for the development and practice of the virtues.

Now, note the similarity between the Goleman et al. (2002) EI in four dimensions (self-awareness, etc.) and MacIntyre’s (1984) virtue ethics. Where the two depart is the emphasis Goleman et al. placed on the work of the individual who develops largely due to his or her own effort with the support of and in the context of a few trusted colleagues (2002). The context within which this development takes place is not addressed by Goleman et al. (2002) to any significant extent. MacIntyre (1984), on the other hand, held that tradition, and the context where one contributes to society that he refers to as practices, are particularly important in defining and supporting the development of virtues. MacIntyre (1984) argued that western philosophical thought has attempted to replace telos that had been first derived from the Greek concept of the good and later from Christian, Judaic, and Muslim theology, with reason and utility—both of which failed to adequately replace telos. With respect to reason, MacIntyre (1984) felt that it cannot provide a genuine comprehension of human’s true end because questions of ends can only be determined through values that are determined subjectively—not through reason. Elaborating, MacIntyre (1984) stated:

\[\ldots\] questions of ends are questions of values, and on values reason is silent; conflict between rival values cannot be rationally settled. Instead one must simply choose—between parties, classes, nations causes, ide-
Nor does reason have power to correct our passions, and therefore it fails at being a telos (MacIntyre, 1984). With respect to utility, it fails as it simply cannot account for the beliefs in statements of moral truths that are founded in subjectivity (MacIntyre, 1984). For example, when something is a moral principle that we must abide by, lack of utility with respect to enacting the principle does not constitute a case of good moral judgment. If something is a moral principle (that supports a telos), then one must enact it regardless of reason, and utility may interfere with upholding the principle. In the Golemanian conception of EI, there is an equivalent to telos in his assertion that knowing one’s ideal self is an important step in the process of developing emotional intelligence. In the next section, we will take a closer look at how telos works in virtue ethics and, by extension, in the cultivation of EI.

A Telos and Unity of Life

An important feature of the ethical life, according to MacIntyre (1984), is that virtues are cultivated within the unity and narrative of a person’s life. This is in contrast to ethics in modernity that partitions each human life into work, leisure, private life, and public life—each of which has its own norms and modes of behaviour (MacIntyre, 1984). MacIntyre (1984) stated: “The unity of a virtue in someone’s life is intelligible only as a characteristic of a unitary life, a life that can be conceived and evaluated as a whole” (p, 205). To the question ‘What might the unity of an individual life consist of?’ he responded: “Its unity is the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. To ask ‘What is good for me?’ is to ask how best might I live out that unity and bring it to completion” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 218). The response and direction to this arises out of the development and understanding of a telos for a human life that “transcends the limited goods of practices by constituting the good of a whole human life” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 203). Further, this telos is reinforced by the virtue of integrity or constancy that provides a singleness of purpose throughout one’s life. This then gives some further understanding of the sense of telos that was identified earlier as a crucial component of the science of ethics.

What do we have in the Golemanian EI that is equivalent or similar to MacIntyre’s (1984) concept of telos and unity of life? The closest thing that we can come up with in reviewing the Goleman’s work is the notion of ideal self. Let us see how this is articulated. Goleman et al. said the key to leadership is emotional resonance that is values-driven, flexible,
open and honest, and connected to people and networks (2002). To further elaborate “emotional resonance,” McKee et al. (2008) stated:

Resonant leaders are attuned to themselves and to the needs, desires and dreams of the people they lead. They are energized by the changing environment and create conditions in which people can be their best. Such leaders seek a meaningful future for their people, organizations, and communities. They are flexible, responsive, and able to establish and maintain powerful and positive relationships. (p. 2)

The foundation of emotional resonance is self-awareness, for which Goleman et al. (2002) proposes an approach. In addressing the question of how one becomes a more self-aware and resonant leader, self-directed learning is an essential principle. That is, the individual must take responsibility for intentionally developing one’s self, which usually requires becoming aware of her or his emotional capacities and working to change negative behavioural habits built up over the decades. This is difficult work as negative habits are ‘hard-wired’ into the brain. Therefore, to begin and sustain real development in emotional intelligence, one must connect with one’s ideal self. In this process one develops a good understanding of his or her dreams, values, goals, emotions, strengths, and limitations. When the connection is made, one feels passionate about the possibilities life holds, and it is this passion that carries one through the difficulties inevitably faced in the process of change. Goleman et al. (2002) stated: “[C]onnecting with the ideal within requires deep introspection at the gut level to reveal the person you would like to be, including what you want in your life” (pp. 115-116). Finding one’s life purpose provides the individual with the motivation to withstand hardships on the way to reaching her or his ideal self. What Goleman et al. (2002) are saying about the ideal self and how we work with it appears similar to MacIntyre’s (1984) observation that the cultivation of habits derived from virtue principles put in order desires and emotions, which in turn enables people to move towards their telos. As we mentioned earlier, for MacIntyre (1984), such cultivation of habits takes place within the context of practices and tradition. It is in the light of MacIntyre’s (1984) articulation of these concepts that we gain an understanding of the shortcomings of the Goleman et al. (2002) proposals, hence we shall consider them in more detail.

**Centrality of Practice and the Role of Tradition in Virtue Ethics**

One’s telos or purpose maybe expressed through the specifics of a practice and it is within a practice that one acts virtuously or otherwise. According to MacIntyre (1984), a practice is any “coherent and complex
form of socially established and cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized” (1984, p. 186). He provides a wide range of examples including football, chess, farming, architecture, physics, raising and sustaining a family, and other cooperative activities. Activities that are not practices are those that develop technical skills, such as learning how to throw a football or learning how to lay bricks, or practicing solving physics problems. These activities do not meet all the requirements of a practice.

Practices result in the achievement of goods within the context of a history, standards of excellence, and obedience to rules set by the practice. Any practitioner is constrained by these conditions (MacIntyre, 1984). According to MacIntyre (1984), goods arising from a practice can be internal and external. External goods are possessions such as power, wealth, and fame that are achieved through competition wherein there must be winners and losers. Although internal goods may be the outcome of competition to excel, their achievement is a good for the community that participates in the practice. Virtues such as justice, courage, and honesty are goods that define our relationships to other people involved in the practice (MacIntyre, 1984).

We believe that leadership in an organization, the professions, or in life, whether sustaining a family, teaching, practicing medicine or law, or other such pursuits falls within MacIntyre’s (1984) definition of a practice. In addition, it is our view that the Golemanian EI is equivalent to the development of internal goods because it deals with the relationships between people, and it is concerned with issues of values, trust, and authenticity (2002). However, it doesn’t take into account the priority work environments place on external goods: a concern articulated by MacIntyre (1984), as we shall see below.

MacIntyre (1984) held that practices and institutions support one another; however, the goods that sustain practices are internal (the virtues) and the goods that sustain institutions are external such as reputation, power, wealth, and so on. Therefore, those working within institutions are subjected to the corrupting influence of these same institutions (MacIntyre, 1984). MacIntyre and Dunne (2002) provided an example in educational institutions whereby their activities are measured in terms of productivity (how many students graduated at what cost) instead of a concern, for example, for the cultural formation of the student. What will happen, for example, when individuals after beginning down the road of EI realize that their ideal selves and the internal goods they seek are not in alignment with the values and external goods sought by their employer? It is likely that these people will either leave their jobs or alternatively experience a loss of well-being.
and a sense of frustration in their jobs. Econometric research conducted by Helliwell (2005) in Europe and North America on social well-being in the workplace suggests that engagement with others in the workplace and community, work place trust, and meaningful work all are very important to workers. We suggest that engagement and trust constitute aspects of goods internal to practice, and meaningful work suggests an alignment with an individual’s values and ideal self. It is interesting that in Helliwell’s research, these categories ranked significantly higher in importance than increasing income above a moderate level (Helliwell, 2005)—a category clearly linked to goods external to practice.

Another very important concept that MacIntyre (1984) introduced is tradition, and we shall now examine how it squares with the Golemanian EI. As we shall see, some tension arises. MacIntyre (1984) stated that a living tradition provides a historical and social context, an argument and framework for the good consistent within the tradition. The individual’s search for his or her good is conducted within the context of that tradition, and both the individual and the tradition are sustained by the virtues of justice, truthfulness, courage, and intellectual virtues. Cultural traditions provide norms, priorities, and assumptions about what it means to be a person and the expectations concerning normal behaviour (Vokey, 2001). According to MacIntyre (1984):

> The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good. (p. 219)

To this point, a number of parallels between the Golemanian development of EI and MacIntyre’s (1984) conception of virtue ethics have been identified; however it is especially on the issue of tradition where a significant departure appears. MacIntyre (1988) holds that liberalism is a tradition founded on concepts that are antithetical to the practice of virtue ethics. He holds that individualism and personal preference are fundamental to liberalism: therefore, there can be no overriding good except that of the principle of the individual and her or his preferences (MacIntyre, 1988). Virtue ethics views the individual as a member of a community, a citizen, who reasons and chooses within this context, whereas liberalism sees the individual as someone who reasons and makes choices within the context of the needs of the individual (MacIntyre, 1988). In addition, liberalism assumes that consumption (acquisitiveness) is a cornerstone of the market economy, which takes
limitless economic growth, not internal goods, as a fundamental good. Conversely, “Aristotelian norms would not only have to view acquisitiveness as a vice but would have to set strict limits to growth insofar as that is necessary to preserve or enhance a distribution of goods according to desert” (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 112).

For these reasons MacIntyre (1988) argued that the tradition of liberalism is not consistent with the tradition of virtue ethics. In addition, he argued that liberalism, by its very nature, accepts a number of rival and incompatible definitions of the good and accounts of the virtues, and therefore there can be no shared program for moral education within public institutions which must accommodate multiple perspectives (MacIntyre, 1999).

With these observations we might conclude by saying that it is impossible to develop virtue ethics in a liberal public education institution, and that EI itself is not a form of virtue ethics as conceived by MacIntyre (1984). That is, if we take MacIntyre’s views seriously, then we cannot be making the case that his virtue ethics could complement and supplement the Goleman et al. (2002) EI project. Where does this situation leave us with our own project of fortifying the Golemanian EI with MacIntyre’s (1984, 1988) virtue ethics? It is at this point that we wish to turn to Vokey (2001) for a critique of MacIntyre’s (1984, 1988) position and a resolution to his concerns, which will give us a way to use the basic insight gained from MacIntyre about the relational and communal nature of the development of virtue to fortify the Goleman et al. (2002) EI proposal.

**Reasons of the Heart and Intrinsic Value**

Vokey (2005) argued it is important that people learn to recognize what a truly virtuous person, who acts based on intrinsic moral values, would do in particular contexts. He holds that MacIntyre’s (1999, MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002) framework for moral education does not achieve this recognition because it relies solely on a discursive and intellectual approach whereas intrinsic value requires both an intellectual understanding and an embodied emotional understanding which are known as “reasons of the heart” (Vokey, 2001, pp. 257-309). Intrinsic value is defined as an event or object judged to be intrinsically good for its own sake as opposed to for the sake of human desires or interests (Vokey, 2005).

Further, Vokey held that people commonly rely on positive and negative aspects of their experiences to justify their judgments of intrinsic value. This cognitive-affective response is evident when people are “profoundly moved in positive ways by experiencing or witnessing
freedom, solidarity and compassion; and profoundly moved in negative ways by experiencing or witnessing oppression, alienation, and indifference” (Vokey, 2005, p. 95). Moreover, Vokey suggested that MacIntyre’s (1984, 1988) moral philosophy is limited in that it emphasizes discursive, propositional knowledge at the expense of practical personal knowledge (Vokey, 2005) and in that it relies on moral theory grounded in a specific faith to justify why virtues should be intrinsically valued (Vokey, 2001). Consistent with this view Vokey (2001) holds that MacIntyre’s (1984, 1988) philosophy has not considered the role of non-conceptual insight to determine intrinsic value; and with respect to telos, it has relegated the quality of human experience to a motivating role as opposed to a cognitional role. That is, MacIntyre’s (1984) concept of telos is grounded in a tradition of faith (Vokey, 2001); therefore, one would only need to know the telos of one’s faith that provides the motivation to pursue a virtuous path. In contrast, Vokey (2005) proposed that people commonly rely on human experience to determine intrinsic value. This ability can be developed in the individual to provide a cognitional capability to apprehend one’s telos and the intrinsic good. Our consideration of Golemanian concept of telos revealed an individually driven process for determining one’s ideal self, which may or may not reference a particular faith. Goleman et al. (2002) recommended that individuals engage in a process of deep introspection at the gut level to reveal their personal ideal, which, in our view, coheres with Vokey’s understanding of intrinsic value. Goleman et al. (2002) do not articulate clearly how this deep introspection can be done to reveal one’s personal ideal.

Vokey (2005) addressed the limitations in MacIntyre’s (1984, 1988) proposals through reference to Mahayana Buddhist traditions, which may provide some clarity to Goleman’s et al. (2002) process. Vokey (2005) proposed that moral education would benefit from an appeal to “reasons of the heart” (Vokey 2001, pp. 257-309). This is achieved through contemplative practices, which he claimed create a state of mind that facilitates a personal direct awareness of intrinsic value (Vokey, 2005). According to this tradition, our usual awareness is dominated by concepts, discursive thought and dualism where subject and object are perceived as separate. Contemplation provides individuals, regardless of their worldviews and traditions with the ability to increase their perception of nondual and nondiscursive states of mind where they may become aware of intrinsic value (Vokey, 2005). To note, nondualistic experiences are not uncommon or esoteric. They are familiar experiences of musicians, dancers, athletes, and so on, where there is no separation between action and agent (Vokey, 2005). Those with a greater awareness of nonduality achieve a clearer perception and purer motivation as a
consequence of their awareness of the unity of all phenomenon (Vokey, 2005). In practical terms, contemplation enables a level of perception that provides a distance from our emotions and the immediacy of our dualistic experience, and yet retains the cognitive content of emotions to provide saliency in practical moral judgments (Vokey, 2005). All of this is not without empirical foundation. Research shows that contemplative practices support EI by increasing awareness of one’s internal experience, promotion of reflection, self-regulation, and caring for others, and results in a mental set that is associated with effective classroom teaching and facilitation (Jennings & Greenberg, 2009).

In our view, the above observations do much to address MacIntyre’s concern (1999, MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002) that virtue ethics cannot be taught in a public education setting since apprehension of intrinsic good through reasons of the heart is available to anyone, regardless of traditions and worldviews, and can be augmented through contemplative practices. In addition, they appear to provide a more structured approach to the EI concept of developing one’s life purpose. Vokey’s (2001) proposal may also help to shift the emphasis away from being solely motivated by one’s purpose to a motivation generated by the intrinsic value of being virtuous. His proposal is based on an articulation of MacIntyre’s concern (1984) regarding the modern manager (and by extension, the educators) being an emotivist, and not being able to participate in the virtues she or he derives for the modern world. MacIntyre (1984) held that they operate in the mode of emotivism because their moral judgments are based on the non-rational, subjective attitudes and feelings of the individual. That is, there are no standards or criteria against which moral judgments are made (MacIntyre, 1984). He also held that emotivism removes the distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations: a valid and serious concern with respect to any application of the Goleman et al. (2002) EI thesis. Influences that the leader’s emotions have on others work just as ethically as unethically.

On this matter, MacIntyre (1984) held that humans who are in relationships uninformed by morality treat the other as a means to his or her ends wherein the other is seen as an instrument. Those in power may apply whatever influences are necessary to achieve through that person. On the other hand, a person guided by morality of intrinsic valuing treats the other as an end. For example, in a leader/subordinate relationship, the leader, rather than coercion or manipulation through his or her position of authority, might offer subordinates good reasons for acting one way or another, and leave it to her or him to evaluate those reasons and act accordingly (MacIntyre, 1984). In this way the values, opinions, and contribution of subordinates are intrinsically valued.
We are indeed concerned that introducing the Goleman et al. (2002) concept of EI to teaching may formalize emotivism, just as MacIntyre (1984) warned us about subjectivity and the lack of criterion. However, we believe that this can be addressed by reinforcing the understanding Goleman et al. (2002) has noted—that a leader’s, or educator’s feelings are not private; they have public consequences. Awareness of this provides a criterion of transparency, authenticity, and honesty that can be called upon when we work with people to cultivate their ethics and emotional intelligence. To some extent it imposes an internal-external measure on the educator to be honest with him or herself and with others. For example, if I as a teacher, am consistently disinterested in teaching or do not have the best interests of my students at heart, this internal state of mind will be felt by the students and my effectiveness as a teacher will be compromised. Ethical teaching then becomes not just a matter of technique but of state of mind of the teacher. Further, addressing MacIntyre’s concerns (1984), once individuals realize the nature of the open relationship they have with others, they are likely to see students and followers intrinsically rather than instrumentally and understand that they are making moral decisions. We believe that the contemplative exercises advocated by Vokey (2001) will strengthen and support this important understanding. The resulting congruence of educators’ values and the nature of their relationships with themselves and others cannot be hidden, and will constitute as the positive force in emotional contagion.

We believe that personal experience and knowledge of the need for intrinsic valuing of others is a foundation of ethics but it does not replace the need for practice and an intellectual understanding of virtue ethics. We would need to impose on ourselves engaged in the task of increasing EI the ethical norms that we normally think of as part of the tradition of virtue ethics such as compassion, courage, honesty, and wisdom and include an examination of our values and life purpose in light of these norms. In addition, given our plural society, we would want to develop a broad knowledge of other ethical systems such as deontology, utility ethics, and the ethics of dominant religions. We believe that adding the extra dimension of ethical considerations, based on MacIntyre’s work (1984, 1988), to the Golemanian EI project would address MacIntyre’s concern that leaders make moral decisions solely on subjective feelings and attitudes and are not subject to external criteria. Hence, the development of EI has the potential to be a moral practice. This could result in a significant shift in thinking. Yet the present reality has not made this shift. MacIntyre (1984) is right in observing that, for much of the twentieth century, managers
and educators viewed those under them instrumentally. He considered educators and managers to fall into a character category that exemplifies the fundamental values of an era (1984): for our era, it is instrumentalism. For example, a contemporary educator may typically be concerned with the well-being of students only in as much as their grades and success provide a good reflection on him or her.

Based on our comparison of Golemanian EI to MacIntyre’s (1984, 1988) virtue ethics we have three considerations that militate against implementing virtue ethics and EI in contemporary educational environments: (a) traditional management practices that see those under them as instruments; (b) our culture that values external goods over internal goods; (c) and the institutions themselves that can only seek external goods. In these environments, it is not difficult to imagine that the concept of EI itself will be instrumentally utilized as a means to achieve higher output, yet its underlying principle appears to lead in a broader direction whereby the well-being of those working in an institution are its primary concern, and the achievement of better performance is secondary. The difference between applying EI to obtain improved productivity over the objective of assisting employees achieve well being has significant implications particularly in the context of a culture and organizations that are instrumentally driven. Perhaps this tension can be resolved through the Goleman’s observation that the self-management of EI “enables transparency, which is not only a virtue but also an organizational strength. Transparency—an authentic openness to others about one’s feelings, beliefs, and actions—allows integrity, or the sense that one can be trusted” (Goleman et al., 2002, p. 47). This attribute relies on impulse control, and allows one to live his or her values. As well, it means one is comfortable with the questions transparency pose (Goleman et al., 2002). We also identified means of augmenting and generalizing MacIntyre’s (1984, 1988) virtue ethics by recommending the introduction of contemplative disciplines as a means of balancing the intellectual emphasis with reference to the quality of human experience.

**Implications for Education**

At the beginning of this article we suggested that how a teacher feels is not a private matter: rather, it has public consequences that impacts students’ performance, and the learning environment might be shaped as much or more by resonance of the educator’s feelings and emotions than their words and actions. Given this, we suggested that educators have a responsibility as part of their training and life long learning to
develop their EI. Further, with the exception of concerns regarding the role of a tradition, we have argued that the development of EI should be a moral practice as defined by MacIntyre (1984). Thus, those developing their EI may be implicitly learning virtue ethics. With respect to education in the virtues, MacIntyre held that the fully virtuous person acts on the basis of knowledge of the good (Vokey, 2001) and that both intellectual virtues and virtues of character are required to achieve this end. Intellectual virtues are acquired through teaching and the virtues of character through habitual exercise (MacIntyre, 1984). MacIntyre (as cited in Vokey, 2001) held that these forms of moral education cannot be separated because “character building requires both the practice of virtuous acts and intellectual knowledge” (pp. 159-160). As we have seen earlier, MacIntyre (1984) held that virtue ethics is developed within the context of one’s life purpose, and exercised over one’s life and within the context of a community and a tradition. In terms of developing one’s EI, Goleman et al. (2002) held that it is developed within the context of one’s life purpose, requires knowledge and practice, and is best conducted with the benefit of a positive supportive community that help people make positive changes, particularly if the relationships are filled with candour, trust, and psychological safety” (p. 163). It is noteworthy that these communities appear to be formed outside the formal structure of the workplace, perhaps because many workplaces do not provide the required sense of psychological safety and personal and existential engagement.

Both MacIntyre (1984) and Goleman et al. (2002) contemplated providing a context within which their respective concepts are to be developed. MacIntyre, (1984) however, proposed a much more rigorous context in the form of a philosophical argument and cultural tradition than Goleman et al. (2002) who proposed ad hoc support groups. We agree with MacIntyre (1984) that current cultural and institutional norms make the development of virtue ethics in our society difficult; however we believe that this concern may be addressed through the provision of formal support for those developing EI and virtue ethics. Therefore, we recommend, for instance with respect to teacher education, virtue ethics to be explicitly incorporated with the concept of EI, and that teacher education as an institution should house a community dedicated to support those developing virtues, or goods internal to practices which define relationships to students, teachers, and administrators. Based on the arguments presented in this paper, we offer the following guidelines to learning communities interested in implementing EI integrated with virtue ethics:

- Clearly define its purpose consistent with virtue ethics;
• Be led by a leader with strong EI and exemplary ethics;
• Provide support for development of one’s life purpose;
• Provide training and a space for contemplative practices;
• Include teaching of theory and practice of ethics;
• Include teaching the theory and practice of developing one’s EI or one of its derivatives as part of its program;
• Provide life-long support for teachers through programs as they encounter ethical and emotional issues in the workplace.

In sum, virtue ethics and EI appear to bear significant similarities. Given this, we argue that the project of cultivating EI will benefit from an explicit recognition that it is indeed virtue ethics. As an implication for teacher education, we propose the need for an appropriately structured community to support teachers in developing ethics and emotional competencies. We have provided broad recommendations on what this might look like, but much needs to be done to fill in the details.

Notes

1 CASEL gathers scientific evidence to demonstrate the contributions of social and emotional learning to students’ academic and social success and provides practitioners and school administrators with the resources to improve and expand social emotional learning. For example, recent research sponsored by CASEL examined the impact of social emotional learning (SEL) programs on K-8 students in the US. This work examined 317 studies involving 324,303 students and observed improvement in student’s social-emotional skills, attitudes about self and others, connection to school, positive social behavior, and academic performance (Payton et al., 2008). CASEL argues that teachers’ social and emotional competence (SEC) contributes to creating a climate conducive to learning and promotes positive development outcomes among students and proposes that programs be created to develop teachers’ SEC (Jennings & Greenberg, 2009).

2 Cohen (2006), Director of CASEL draws a close association between SEL and ethical development.

3 One of the ethical frameworks that we have considered for our project of fortifying Goleman’s (2002) EI theory with an ethical theory is ethics of care as developed by Noddings (Noddings, 2002; Noddings, 2006; Noddings, 2006; Noddings, 2010), a prominent theorist and proponent of ethics of care (from here on, EC). Our pragmatic decision, however, is not to utilize this theory, despite the fact that ethics of care has some similarities to EI. For example, EC does accord priority to emotion over reason, and also emphasizes the relational aspect of learning to be moral. However, we found that MacIntyre’s (1984) Aristotelian based virtue ethics to be far more congruent with EI, and, as this paper will show, to have the right features that we are looking for with which to modify and
augment EI. These features mostly have to do with rigorous and even painstaking cultivation of individual moral agency that virtue ethics articulates. EC, in contrast, is not focused on such cultivation as it sees care as innate and emergent from human sociality, and just needs to be extended appropriately for it to be a moral force. Not incidentally, Noddings denies that care is a virtue (Halwani, 2003). Virtue ethics, however, relies on individuals striving for their personal ideal and an understanding of the nature of consciousness. These differences inform a different emphasis and approach to moral education—a topic eminently worth exploring but not within this paper with its particular objective.

4 “From a moral perspective, EI lacks moral depth and does not exclude the possibility that a calculated Machiavellian personality can be deemed emotionally intelligent. From an educational perspective, the paucity of solid empirical research on the efficiency of SEL programs adds further doubts to the psychological and moral ones about the viability of EI training in the classroom” (Kristjánsson, 2006, p.55) The validity of the construct was further criticized by Waterhouse who supports Kristjánsson’s observations regarding its inadequacies in promoting moral development and further states that “emotional intelligence theories have inadequate empirical support and are not consistent with cognitive neuroscience findings” and should not be applied in education (2006 p.247). In response empirical research is cited to refute the neuroscience and moral criticisms (Cherniss, Extein, Goleman, & Weissberg, 2006), however we believe that philosophic concerns regarding the lack of moral depth of EI were not specifically or adequately addressed in this paper.

Feminists have been rightly pointing out that the classic western philosophical traditions’ separation of intellect and emotion, and devaluation of the latter, is concomitant with devaluation of the female gender (Martin 1981, Noddings 2002). We the authors of this paper agree. We also agree that there may be manifest gender differences (whether socially constructed or biologically based) in terms of all manners of social practices, including how we participate in the world and care for things and beings. Ethics of care centralizes gender difference, and is committed to honouring the feminine way of being moral—caring. Coming from our Asian philosophical perspective, however, we do not see care as a gendered capacity. Nor do we see the feminine as essentially belonging to females. ‘Feminine’ and ‘masculine’ are archetypal psychological principles that both males and females embody and need to work with in cultivating moral agency.

References


