
Sympathy in John Dewey's Primary Writings

The Basis for Democratic Community

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Abstract

This paper builds upon John Dewey's understanding of democratic community and argues that it is undergirded by the conception of sympathy. The concept of sympathy is integral in understanding what Dewey meant by democracy as a form of ethical association, a consideration relevant in contemporary American society due to the growing polarization in American politics and life. Dewey understood that sympathy involves an understanding of our own limitations, a willingness to listen even if we disagree, and an approach to life with humility and respect for the other. I briefly explore sympathy through the primary works of Dewey, *The Early Works*, *The Middle Works*, and *The Later Works*, where he addresses the concept of sympathy.

Introduction

As a student of community and the community school, I often think about what constitutes a democratic community and what does not. There are many forms of community and we often speak of it in

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geographical or descriptive terms such as the local community, the community park, the community church, or the academic community. What concerns me today is how community and our understanding of it can be manipulated or become oppressive and exclusive. I wish to explore community from an ethical perspective rather than geographically or descriptively and I believe that John Dewey's understanding of sympathy is a key component for conceptualizing and integrating democratic community. Why is this important? Just because people participate in democratic activities such as voting and may represent a form of solidarity emotionally and politically, does not necessarily constitute a democratic community. It is central we become sensitive to forms of community that undermine our republican form of government and civic understanding, responsibility, and proper engagement. When Dewey referred to democracy as a form of ethical association, he was talking about a form of community, and I will argue, a community undergirded by sympathy.

In attempting to grasp the concept of democratic community, what holds the ethical association as we pursue life, liberty, and happiness? I will argue that it is sympathy for the other, and the pursuit of happiness is not merely individual but within a social context attentive to the desires and needs of the other. This does not involve agreement, but it does imply a willingness to listen and consider another's point of view. For this analysis, I will explore Dewey's primary writings in *The Early Works*, *Middle Works*, and *Later Works*, where he specifically addresses the concept of sympathy.¹ I have examined every instance where Dewey used the word sympathy in his published writings. I did not include an analysis of the concept when Dewey was using the term to express agreement with a philosophical or political position.

Etymologically, the word sympathy derives from the Latin (*sympathia*) and Greek (*Sympatheia*) word, which means a "feeling or similarity to someone else."² It can also imply the sharing of the feelings or interests of another, the expression of pity for the suffering of another. It can imply an inclination to think like or be in accord with an emotion or belief, an affinity between people or relationships, or to act in "unity or harmony in action or effects."³ Edward Mooney, in the *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, describes sympathy as an altruistic emotion that "includes love, concern, compassion, and fellow-feeling, emotions that are naturally expressed in conduct that is caring, helpful, or benevolent." "Sympathy," he writes, "presupposes a capacity for empathy, the ability to share imaginatively and to identify with another's feelings, perceptions, cares, or commitments."⁴ Sympathy is a form of action, that pushes us to move toward some form of benevolent action. It can

refer to an inner state or “traits that serve to represent or to reflect to the self the point of another person and to move the beholder to try and ameliorate the other person’s discomfort.”⁵ Regardless of this inner state, this reflection always takes place in a social-cultural setting and may be impacted by traditional values or religious beliefs.⁶

Philosophical Conceptions of Sympathy

While better analyzed in a longer paper, philosophers have often included sympathy in their discussion of ethics. David Hume (1711-1776) and Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) consider sympathy an important part of their philosophical ethics. Mooney writes, “For Hume sympathy permits us to recognize and approvingly respond to virtue in others,” where we align with the other and “rejoice in the happiness of others and are moved to celebrate their good fortune.”⁷ Hume sees sympathy in the social sense, related to our self-esteem and self-worth as sympathy is mutually reciprocated. In his *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume writes, “No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however, different from, or even contrary to our own.”⁸ In a similar sense, Schopenhauer viewed sympathy as one of the highest of moral virtues. Although influenced by Kant, Goethe, and French sensualism, Schopenhauer refuses to give Kant’s categorical imperative the basis for moral behavior and saw the imperative as “an empty abstract rule.”⁹ For Schopenhauer, reason could not lead humankind to morality, it took human will also. He sees sympathy as “the only origin for altruistic acts and therefore as the true basis of morality.”¹⁰ Schopenhauer envisioned sympathy as the foundation of justice and sympathy as the obverse of egoism or individualism. Sympathy breaks “through the separateness that divides one person from another.”¹¹ This is not to suggest that sympathy is opposed to the self but that the self is nourished and sustained by others’ expressing sympathy to us.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) tended to see sympathy as “disguised self-interest” while Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) saw it as altruistic and an emotion or inclination apart from deliberative will. Kant considered sympathy more of a mood than a virtue and can only become a virtue when linked to reason, such as a moral law. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) viewed sympathy as weakness and had met its death with the demise of Christianity. For Nietzsche, sympathy was actually dangerous in that it hindered humankind from alliances with the Uber-

mensch, who must be "strong and tough and should not be moved by the sorrow of others."¹²

John Dewey and Sympathy

John Dewey also emphasized the concept of sympathy, and it forms the basis for his theory of community. The concept of sympathy is an integral component of pragmatist ethics, so let's take a moment to look at Dewey's use of sympathy and how it forms the basis for his theory of community.

In *The Early Works*, the discussion of sympathy is predominately found in Dewey's work *Psychology*, written for his students at the University of Michigan. In *Psychology*, Dewey is attempting to balance his growing belief in science as inquiry and his attempt for unification through the absolute idealism of Hegel. At the time of publication of *Psychology*, Dewey was still influenced by his religious upbringing in New England Congregationalism, which remained until the 1880s. In a short biography, published by Jane Dewey, she attempted to explain his reasoning at the time.¹³ "He had tried without being aware of the effect this required of him, to believe in the doctrines of the church, but his belief was never whole-hearted enough to satisfy his irrational need."¹⁴ This philosophical attempt at reconciliation was heavily criticized by William James, G. Stanley Hall, and Shadsworth Hodgson. Dewey will eventually discard these attempts at unification through Hegel, but he will keep the spiritual component of community as the basis for democratic association.

In a discussion of liberalism, Dewey described it not as a philosophy or political agenda, but an attitude of mind or attitude of "amicability, sympathy with the underdog, kindness, etc. forward looking-as opposed to backward-looking, toward to the past attitude. Progress and evolution, not revolution."¹⁵ Dewey is giving us an early glimpse into his theory of community as the cornerstone of democracy, with sympathy at the core. In his *Psychology*, he identifies sympathy with the experiences of others, where we "take the feelings of another for our own."¹⁶ At this point in his early thought, he seems to see it as a part of our nature, as selfish or imitative. In this reflex or imitation mode, we "reproduce the feelings of those about us, we take on their mood unaware."¹⁷ However, Dewey goes on to say that this is only the "basis of the emotion" but in full measure sympathy is where we connect our personal experience with that of the other. "It is impossible," Dewey asserts, "to over-estimate the importance of sympathy in the emotional life. It is there what attention is in the strictly intellectual department, as the latter is the

sole means by which objects and relations come within reach of our consciousness, so sympathy is the sole means by which persons come within the range of our life.”¹⁸ Sympathy is universal in that it takes us beyond the ego, beyond individual or private interest. He contends that while sympathy may be an innately human characteristic, it is strengthened or learned as we engage or interact with others. “Sympathy,” Dewey notes, “is the reproduction of the experience of another, accompanied by the recognition of the fact that is his experience.”¹⁹ So he sees sympathy as the conscious or unconscious reproduction of the feelings of others being reproduced in our own minds. “We must not only take their life into ours, but we must put ours into theirs. Sympathy, active interest thus becomes love and a spring to action.”²⁰ It is through sympathy that we come to understand others, taking us beyond the self-interest and concerns of the self. Dewey describes sympathy as the “union between me; it is to the social sphere what gravitation is to the physical. It is the expression of the spiritual unity of mankind.”²¹ It is this spiritual unity that helps form the basis for community; but cannot exist in the democratic sense when people are self-absorbed, narcissistic, and materialistic, refusing to identify with the experiences of the other. Dewey views pride as a form of self-respect, a feeling of our self-worth, “but the obverse of sympathy.”²² He further contends that sympathy is the source of all moral feeling, that “may be extended to include all possible relations, intellectual and aesthetic as well as the strictly social, but this only when these relations are brought into connection with personality. In studying moral feelings, we have only to ascertain how they are developed out of the social feelings, and what elements, hitherto unrecognized, this development introduces.”²³

When we take an active interest in others, it allows us to better understand them. “We must not only take their life into ours,” Dewey stated, “but we must put ours into them.” Sympathy becomes love and the spring to action, while “hate is antipathy.”²⁴ Love is “interest in the well-being of another for his own sake, it involves hatred for all that hinders this well-being.”²⁵ In an essay, “Evolution and Ethics,” Dewey addressed the biological conception of social life as influenced largely by the work of Herbert Spencer and his social Darwinism, and Dewey challenged the growing individualism and materialism in American society at the time. Approaching the question of evolution and ethics dialectically, Dewey argued, “The role of the cosmic process is struggle and strife. The role of the ethical process is sympathy and cooperation. The end of the cosmic process is survival of the fittest, that of ethical, the fitting of as many as possible to survive. Before the ethical tribunal, the cosmic process stands condemned.”²⁶

As we move to Dewey's *Middle Works*, we encounter his most extensive discussion of sympathy, often related to his philosophy of education. As we are all familiar, Dewey envisioned the school as the primary institution to restore community life. In an address given to the National Council of Education in July 1902 entitled "The School as Social Centre," he described the school as the social center of the community, and that our "most pressing political problems cannot be solved by special measures of legislation or executive activity, but only by the promotion of common sympathies and a common understanding." The school as a social center must "provide means for bringing people together and their ideas and beliefs together, in such ways as will lessen friction and instability, and introduce deeper sympathy and wider understanding."²⁷ In this article, Dewey conveys his concerns on questions of race, immigration and assimilation, and capitalism and how they need to be addressed as first moral, then politically. "Bigotry, intolerance, or even an unswerving faith in the superiority of one's own religion and political creed, are much shaken when individuals are brought face-to-face with each other or have the idea of others continuously and forcibly placed before them."²⁸ Dewey contended the school as a "social centre [sic]" was the best means to promote "social and intellectual intercourse" leading to sympathy for the other. Subject matter was not "something fixed and ready-made in itself," but needed to be linked by the teacher to the experiences of the child, guided by their interests.²⁹ These experiences are not singular, as too often approached by traditional education, but social through interaction with others through inquiry and mutual exchange of ideas.

Based on Dewey's educational experience in the Dewey Lab School at the University of Chicago, in *The Child and the Curriculum*, a work familiar to progressive educators at the time, Dewey describes the narrow and intimate world of the child, a world ideally of affection and sympathy.³⁰ He was very sensitive that through experiences in the classroom students become "acquainted with the conditions of work" so they could develop a sympathy for labor as a whole.³¹ In an essay, *Democracy in Education*, Dewey presents a challenge to traditional education as being undemocratic. He describes education as "the most personal, the most intimate, of all human affairs..." and sees the ideal teacher as one of character and sympathy with children, their world and their interests.³² He feared a school system that undermined individual initiative and "inventive ability" and hampered the child as they entered the schoolroom.³³ "The school," Dewey writes, "would lose the special code of ethics and moral training," often tied to religion, and "take up into itself the moral aims and forces of social sympathy,

cooperation and progress.”³⁴ He believed the traditional school could not lend “itself to the development of a vital social spirit or to methods that appeal to sympathy and cooperation when it moved instead to absorption, exclusiveness, and competition.”³⁵ Hence Dewey contends, “it becomes an all-important matter to know how we shall apply our social standard of moral value to the subject matter of school work, to what we call, traditionally, the studies that occupy pupils.”³⁶ The curriculum was to be “selected and organized as to provide the material for affording the child a consciousness of the world in which he has to play a part, and the demands he has to meet; so far as these ends are met, the school is organized on an ethical basis.”³⁷ This type of curriculum nurtures a spirit of community. For Dewey, the ideal teacher held a “love of knowledge, a sympathy with growth, intellectual and moral,” and an “interest in the improvement of society through improving the individuals who compose it.”³⁸ The ideal teacher was one of sympathetic character.

Not surprisingly one of Dewey’s most extensive discussions of sympathy occurs in his book *Ethics*, a collaboration with James Tufts and first published in 1908. In describing the characteristics of the moral, Dewey denotes it as a “regard for others, under its various aspects of justice, sympathy, and benevolence.”³⁹ Sympathy, affection, building common purpose, and common interest are fundamental in building the social self. For Dewey, cooperation implies a common end, and “this common end forms then a controlling rule of action, and the mutual interest means sympathy.”⁴⁰ The truly moral person assumes the responsibility of their freedom seeking justice, kindness, and happiness for all as the common good, a reconstructed individual. Dewey notes, the reconstructed individual was “a person who is individual in choice, in feeling, in responsibility, and at the same time social in what he regards as good, in his sympathies and in his purpose. Otherwise, individualism means progress toward the immoral.”⁴¹

Dewey still saw sympathy as a natural instinct that can vary in “intensity in different individuals” and wished to distinguish sympathy that is just sentiment leading to selfishness. Yet, he saw instinctive sympathy as partial and states, “it may attach itself vehemently to those of blood kin or to immediate associations in such a way as to favor them at the expense of others, and lead to positive injustice toward those beyond the charmed circle.”⁴² He contends that it is through deliberation and thoughtfulness that “sympathy widens our interest in consequences and leads us to take into account such results as affect the welfare of others; it aids us to count and weigh those consequences as counting for as much as those which touch our own honor, purse, or

power.”⁴³ Sympathy, in short,” Dewey surmises,” is the general principle of moral knowledge, not because its commands take precedence over others (which they do not necessarily) but because it furnishes the most reliable and efficacious intellectual standpoint.”⁴⁴ This intellectual standpoint is a kind of thoughtfulness.

In *How We Think*, Dewey describes this type of reflection as “the kind of thinking that consists in turning a subject over in the mind and giving it serious and consecutive consideration.”⁴⁵ The school is vital here for it is the primary institution in which this type of reflection is practical or becomes a habit or in a modern conceptualization a disposition, and as Maxine Greene contends a reflective thinking “engages young people in active pursuits of meaning, of sense making with regard to their lived worlds and their own unpredictable lives.”⁴⁶ Thinking for Dewey implied a thoughtfulness, an openness to new perspectives and what he described in *How We Think* as “a power of increased discrimination of final values,” becoming awake to possibilities.⁴⁷ Reflection embodies both sympathy and method.⁴⁸ So sympathy is the putting of the self in the place of the other, “to see from the standpoint of his purposes and values, to humble our estimate of our own claims and pretensions to the level they would assume in the eyes of a sympathetic and impartial observer, is the surest way to attain universality and objectivity in moral knowledge.”⁴⁹ For Dewey, it is through education that the right kind of thought and sympathy become effective. Education, in its broadest sense, is a process by which we learn cooperation and the importance of working together for the common good. Dewey constantly reiterated the ultimate goal of education in a democracy was preparation for life in a democratic society, not narrow preparation for work. In connecting the significance of this thought to democratic community Dewey asserts, “Men without friendships, love, pity, sympathy, communication, cooperation, justice, rights or duties, would be deprived of nearly all that gives life its values.”⁵⁰

In 1915 Dewey and his daughter Evelyn examined several progressive schools in *Schools of Tomorrow*. At the time of its publication, *Schools of Tomorrow* was the best collection of information on progressive schools and according to Dewey biography George Dykhuizen “details the different methods used by several schools to make education fit the growing child’s needs and interests.”⁵¹ Dewey spoke to his concern that a traditional or academic education tended to “turn out future citizens with no sympathy for work done with the hands, and with absolutely no training and understanding of the most serious present-day social and political difficulties.” Dewey referred to it as a plan of “social predestination totally foreign to the spirit of a democracy.”⁵²

One year later in *Democracy and Education*, Dewey's most significant work on his philosophy of education in a democratic society, Dewey attempted to distinguish two types of community, a community "of purpose and welfare, loyalty to public ends, and mutuality of sympathy," to a community that "banded together in criminal conspiracy,"... that "preyed upon the public while pretending to serve it and political machines seeking power and plunder rather than the interest of the people. Here Dewey uses sympathy in a way that can help us distinguish the democratic community from its obverse.⁵³ Once again, Dewey envisioned the school as the best means to restore community life, the community being the glue holding democratic society together and the school the best tool for integrating children into social life. In one of his most cited phrases, Dewey described democracy as a "mode of associated living of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in the interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity."⁵⁴ When one considers the actions and thoughts of another as compared to one's on, you engage in a form of sympathy. Democratic virtues, undergirded by sympathy, included free inquiry, toleration of diverse opinions, and free and open communication.⁵⁵

Continuing along those lines in *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Dewey argued that our moral failures result from the absence of sympathy, a weakness of disposition, but with it we are better able to attack self-interest, as it enables us to "undertake the work of analysis and decision intelligently..."⁵⁶ Dewey viewed inquiry as a form of intelligence, best guided by the method of the sciences and social sciences and best took place in free and open communication, working together to exchange ideas and to solve the economic, social, and political problems of the day. This was the type of collective thinking Dewey argued "must replace interest in abstract moral and social concepts and their rational systemization," thus a reconstruction in philosophy to meet the changes of the modern world.⁵⁷ For Dewey science had freed us from the fixed and the static, just as democracy freed us from the divine right of kings.

In *Human Nature and Conduct*, Dewey claims that to check the influence of hate we need sympathy, which serves to evoke certain dispositions such as curiosity, explanation, experimentation, frankness, and respect for the feelings of others. These dispositions, or better habits for Dewey, form the basis of intelligence, or conscious thought.⁵⁸ If we

wish to deal with others and to modify dispositions such as self-interests, Dewey contends we need to do so in an “artistic way, a way which requires sympathy and interest to make all of the needed adjustments to the particular emergencies of the act.”⁵⁹ Robert Westbrook states, “Indeed, thoughtfulness was the most important of the habits human beings had developed for it permitted a flexible, adaptative response to novel situations.”⁶⁰

In a short essay, “Understanding and Prejudice,” Dewey addressed the importance of sympathy in challenging prejudice leading to greater understanding bringing about “harmony, peace, and cooperation...”⁶¹ He sensed schools could do more in “breaking down class division, creating a feeling of greater humanity and of membership in a single family.”⁶² Schools could help foster those habits conducive to the democratic life, such as sensitivity, generosity, imagination, creativity, and impartiality.⁶³

In 1932, in the midst of the Great Depression, Dewey published a second edition of his book *Ethics* with his concern for sympathy once again emphasized. He reiterated that moral life is characterized by the development of intelligence, cooperation, and sympathy. It is sympathy that separates the intelligent and cooperative from potential deviance with cooperation “one of nature’s most effective agencies for a social standard and a social feeling.”⁶⁴ Again, he likes to refer to sympathy as more than sentimentalism, and emphasized intelligence, the reflective inquiry in which we seek and desire to view things from the standpoint of the other. Dewey wished to connect it with wisdom and thoughtfulness, “concern for the welfare of all affected by conduct... the surest guarantee for the exercise of consideration, for examination of a proposed line of conduct in all its bearing.”⁶⁵ Sympathy extends thought beyond self and saves consideration of consequences from degenerating into mere calculation (such as utilitarianism-my emphasis) by rendering vivid the interests of others, to see things from the position of the other, “their purposes and values, to humble, contra wise, our own pretension and claims till they reach the level they would assume in the eye of an impartial sympathetic observer is the surest way to attain objectivity of moral knowledge.” Sympathy is a tool for resolving complex situations.⁶⁶ For Dewey, we cannot solve complex social, political, or economic problems without sympathetic dispositions. Once again, the school is crucial here because it should serve to foster an environment where children can develop through social interaction, sympathy, and kindness, ideally learning reflection and thoughtful behavior with the willingness and desire to consider the values and beliefs of others in the context of one’s own.⁶⁷

Scott R. Stroud writes, sympathy as a “method would call on us to recognize inherent similarities among agents and selves—including our self—in communicative settings. It would lead us to think around several particular ways to self-conceit; think from the position of the other and why they might be arguing in that way.”⁶⁸ To do this we must be willing to examine thoughtfully our own beliefs and values; the pragmatist conception of democracy demands this as we engage and willingly listen to others in a form of sympathy. Sympathy, by its nature, rejects the ideological either/or, or those who tend to refuse to engage in open discourse because their position is perceived in the form of a truth claim. This is the anti-thesis of democratic thinking.

Conclusion

Ulrich Beck writes, “We live in an age in which the social order of the national state, class, ethnicity and the traditional family is in decline. The ethic of the individual self-fulfilled and achieved is the most powerful current in modern society. The choosing, deciding, shaping human being who aspires to be the author of his or her own life, the creator of an individual identity, is the central character of our time.”⁶⁹ In essence, this is what Dewey feared, where “the isolated, competitive individual is the basic unit of human experience.”⁷⁰ This characteristic of neo-liberal culture inhibits our ability to work in collective space for the common good, a form of civic engagement.

Dewey clearly envisioned the school as an institution that could foster civic engagement, but can an “institution of the mainstream be used to lead us out of the quandary, or do these institutions have to radically change?”⁷¹ The recent election of 2020, the challenging of legitimate results, and the storming of the U.S. capitol show that American democracy is in crisis and that there has been a failure in educating the public as to what constitutes civic virtue and civic engagement. We now find ourselves in an “ideological standoff” where there is a refusal to engage in “civil discourse, critical thought,” and a lack of “willingness to sacrifice individual interests to the greater good.”⁷² Dewey sought a balance of the role of the individual within the social, “affirming individual and communal dimensions simultaneously, and in the generalized belief in the human possibilities by which culture is energized.”⁷³ Neo-liberalism conceives democracy as an individual act and is too often construed in a materialist/consumerist fashion. In this construction, “me” comes before “we” and undermines the democratic community undergirded by sympathy as Dewey understood it. “Under these conditions,” writes Stephen Rowe, “the human spirit atrophies

and development is stunted.”⁷⁴ Dewey envisioned sympathy as a sentiment but one tied to an intellectual method, a method of intelligence, in the form of reflective thoughtfulness, in which we seek to push ourselves “to think around our biases in reasoning and judgment, especially in cases of heated argument with others.”⁷⁵

In a Deweyan context, Yuval Levin notes, “Out national revival will ultimately depend on our ability to revive human-sized institutions of various forms and characters: familial and communal, social and political (of all parties and stripes) charitable and commercial, educational and spiritual, sacred and profane.”⁷⁶

Dewey argued that the transition from a rural/agrarian society to an industrial/capitalist one undermined community and thus impacting human relations. He understood the move to materialism and individualism as a threat to democracy. “Increasingly,” notes Rowe, “democratic values were displaced by corporate values, as democracy came to be understood in procedural rather than substantive terms, as a structure of government rather than community, as the distinctly minimalist form of government most friendly to capitalism.”⁷⁷ This is what Dewey meant when he described democracy as more than a form of government. Building a truly democratic community relies on sympathy for the other, where we grasp our own limitations in a sense of humility, a willingness to listen, to cooperate as we “discover together the surprising new life which emerges in our midst when we are together in this way-in the shared commitment to a healthy planet.”⁷⁸

Notes

¹ I am using the accepted form of reference to *The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882-1953*, edited by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969-1991). *EW* (The Early Works), *MW* (The Middle Works), and *LW* (The Later Works). I made extensive use of The Collected Works (The Electronic Edition), edited by Larry Hickman (Charlottesville, VA: Intelix Corporation, 1996).

² Sympathy.” In *Word Origins*, by John Ayto. 2nd Ed. (London: A. & C. Black, 2006). <https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/acbwordorig/sympathy/>

³ “Sympathy.” In the *Penguin English Dictionary*, ed. R.E. Allen, 3rd ed. (London: Penguin, 2007). <https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/penguin/sympathy/>

⁴ Edward F. Mooney, “Sympathy,” In *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, ed. L.C. Becker and C.B. Becker, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2001). <https://search.credoreference.co./content/entry/routethics/sympathy/>

⁵ Lauren Wispe, “Toward an Integration,” in *Altruism, Sympathy, and Helping: Psychological and Sociological Principles*, ed. Lauren Wispe (New

York: Academic Press, 1978), 319.

⁶ Ronald Cohen, "Altruism: Human, Cultural, or What?" in *Altruism, Sympathy, and Helping: Psychological and Sociological Principles*, ed. Lauren Wispe (New York: Academic Press, 1978), 87.

⁷ Mooney, "Sympathy," 1.

⁸ David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1896), 166. This is a reprint of the original edition published in three volumes in 1739.

⁹ Helmut Luck, "Aspects of a Transnational Theory of Prosocial Behavior," in *Altruism, Sympathy, and Helping: Psychological and Sociological Principles*, ed. Lauren Wispe (New York: Academic Press, 1978), 212.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Mooney, "Sympathy," 2.

¹² Luck, "Aspects of a Transnational Theory of Prosocial Behavior," 212. See also Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen* (Leipzig: Naumann Publishing, 1899).

¹³ Jane Dewey, "Biography of John Dewey," in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, ed. Paul Schilpp and Lewis Hahn, The Library of Living Philosophers (LaSalle Illinois: Open Court, 1939), 3–45.

¹⁴ Ibid., 18. For Dewey's view on psychology at the time see also "The New Psychology," *EW* 1: 48-60 and "Soul and Body," *EW* 1: 93-115.

¹⁵ John Dewey, *EW* 2: 210. Herbert Schneider notes that during the years at the University of Chicago, Dewey changed his thought on psychology, his "genetic" method becoming more of a "social psychology" influenced by his colleague George Herbert Mead and other University of Chicago anthropologists. Human nature and conduct was becoming "increasingly social and behavioral, approaching a cultural analysis." *EW* 2: xxv. This approach is evident in Dewey's understanding of sympathy as a social construct, an experience or interaction with the self and the other.

¹⁶ Dewey, *EW* 2: 284.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 285.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 286.

²² Ibid., 287.

²³ Ibid., 288.

²⁴ Ibid., 285.

²⁵ Ibid., 293.

²⁶ Dewey, *EW* 5: 36.

²⁷ Dewey, *MW* 2: 82, 90. Dewey is seeking a kind of open communication to which we can come to a form of mutual understanding, similar to that of Hans Georg Gadamer. See Richard J. Bernstein, *Philosophical Profiles* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 58-93.

²⁸ Ibid., 84.

²⁹ Ibid., 278.

³⁰ Ibid., 274.

³¹ Dewey, *EW* 5: 451.

³² Dewey, *MW* 3: 234.

³³ Ibid., 234.

³⁴ Dewey, *MW* 4: 191.

³⁵ Ibid., 213.

³⁶ Ibid., 279.

³⁷ Ibid., 285.

³⁸ Dewey, *LW* 13: 346.

³⁹ Dewey, *MW* 5: 13.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 46.

⁴¹ Ibid., 76.

⁴² Ibid., 272.

⁴³ Ibid., 302.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 303.

⁴⁵ Dewey, *LW* 8: 112.

⁴⁶ Maxine Greene, "Foreword," in John Dewey, *How We Think* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), vii.

⁴⁷ Dewey, *MW* 8: 349.

⁴⁸ Scott R. Stroud, "Democracy, Partnership, and the Meliorative Value of Sympathy in John Dewey's Philosophy of Communication," *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 30, no. 1 (2016): 86.

⁴⁹ Dewey, *MW* 5: 303.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 439. Dewey placed a great deal of emphasis on the family as a social agency where we learn "tenderness, sympathy, self-sacrifice, and steadiness of purpose," an example that ideally has as its end the benefit of the common good. *MW* 5: 510.

⁵¹ George Dykhuizen, *The Life and Mind of John Dewey* (Carbondale: Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973), 177.

⁵² Dewey, *MW* 8: 404.

⁵³ Dewey, *MW* 9: 88.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 93.

⁵⁵ Robert B. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 170.

⁵⁶ Dewey, *MW* 12: 174.

⁵⁷ Dykhuizen, *The Life and Mind of John Dewey*, 190.

⁵⁸ Dewey, *MW* 14: 171.

⁵⁹ Dewey, *MW* 15: 180.

⁶⁰ Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy*, 292-293.

⁶¹ Dewey, *LW* 5: 398.

⁶² Dewey, *LW* 13: 302.

⁶³ John Dewey, *How We Think* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1933), 144.

⁶⁴ Dewey, *LW* 7: 44.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 259.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 270, 271.

⁶⁷ Stroud, "Democracy, Partnership, and the Meliorative Value of Sympa-

thy in John Dewey's Philosophy of Communication," 86.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 87.

⁶⁹ Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, *Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and Its Social and Political Consequences* (London: SAGE Publications, 2002), 23.

⁷⁰ Jeremy Gilbert, *Common Ground: Democracy and Collectivity in an Age of Individualism* (London: Pluto Press, 2014), viii.

⁷¹ Ibid., 214.

⁷² Stephen C. Rowe, *Overcoming America/America Overcoming: Can We Survive Modernity?* (New York: Lexington Books, 2013), 21.

⁷³ Ibid., 168.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 38.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 92.

⁷⁶ Yuval Levin, *The Fractured Republic: Renewing America's Social Contract in the Age of Individualism* (New York: Basic Books, Perseus Books Group, 2016), 218.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 23.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 209.